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ABSTRACT 
In this age of information, the efficient use of electronic communications is essential. As 
technology advances and becomes more complex, it is imperative that groups be able to 
discuss ideas and disseminate information among members effectively. Multicast groups are 
established to facilitate these information transactions. Since the members of these groups 
may be spread across the globe, the communications must be secure as well as efficient. 
Secure multicasting is an active area of research today. 
Though the areas of secure multicast group architecture, key distribution, and sender 
authentication are under scrutiny, one topic that has not been explored is how to integrate 
these with multilevel security. Multilevel security is the ability to distinguish subjects 
according to classification levels, which determines to what degree they can access 
confidential objects. In the case of groups, this means that some members can exchange 
messages at a higher sensitivity level than others. The Bell-La Padula model outlines the 
rules of these multilevel accesses. In multicast groups that employ multilevel security, some 
of these rules are not desirable so a modified set of rules was developed and is termed 
differential security. 
This thesis proposes three possible methods in which to set up a differentially secure 
multicast group: a na'ive approach, a multiple tree differential security (DiffSec) approach, 
and a single DiffSec tree approach. In order to evaluate the performances (in terms of the 
number of links used per packet transmitted) of these approaches, extensive simulation 
experiments were conducted by varying the network connectivity and group size for both 
uniform and nonuniform membership distribution across security levels. Our studies show 
that the multiple tree and single DiffSec tree approaches perform much better than the na'ive 
situation. While the multiple tree approach could be implemented using current technology, 
this scheme consumes many times more addresses and network resources than the single 
DiffSec tree approach. From our studies, we conclude that the single DiffSec tree is a viable 
option for supporting multilevel security as it maximizes the resource utilization and is also 
scalable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY 
It is readily apparent that electronic communications are vital in today's world. These 
communications are at a higher volume than they have ever been and the amount will only 
continue to increase for the foreseeable future. Since the beginning of computer networks, 
when they were used mostly for exchanges of academic ideas or commercial processing, the 
ways in which they are used have constantly expanded. No longer limited to a few academic 
or commercial applications, electronic communications now include conversations between 
individuals, commerce between businesses and consumers, financial transactions for 
investing or managing assets, inquiring or exchanging information regarding health issues, 
and a myriad of other services. 
As additional uses developed and more entities became interested in these 
communications, the number and size of the networks has had to expand. To keep 
transactions cost-efficient, networks have been coupled to facilitate exchanges and allow a 
broader reach of electronic communications. Now communications flow between as well as 
within networks. Though this inter-network exchange is beneficial, it also means that control 
over the flow of information is lost. In order to regain some control over who can intercept, 
read, or change messages while they are in transit, the concepts of computing security were 
developed, which is part of the broader field of information assurance. 
Computing security makes use of cryptology, which plays an important role in this 
thesis. To secure data in a broadcast network environment, it is encrypted. Groups of hosts 
maintain security through the use of encryption algorithms and shared cryptographic keys. 
1.1 Goals of Security 
The goals of computing security are to assure information confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability [Pf97] .. The following definitions will focus on assurance as it relates to 
communication, though these goals relate to securing all computing resources. 
Confidentiality, also known as secrecy or privacy, relates to the ability to ensure that only 
authorized entities are able to read or know the contents of a message. Assurance of integrity 
means a guarantee that the communication was modified only by an authorized party and 
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only in a prescribed way. To assure availability is to make certain that authorized parties are 
not prevented from receiving or sending communications when they have legitimate access, 
or in other words, that they are not denied service. 
These goals address the methods that are used to attack information. The threats to 
secure communications include interception, modification, fabrication, and interruption 
[Pf97]. The first three involve reading, changing, or inventing the contents of a message by 
an unauthorized party. The last involves blocking the communication from reaching the 
intended recipient or corrupting the message so that it can no longer be read. Preventing 
interruption of network communication is a topic in and of itself and beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It is not always possible to prevent interception, modification, or fabrication, but by 
using the mathematical functions of encryption, it is possible to make the contents of an 
intercepted message meaningless to an unauthorized party and to alert an authorized recipient 
to modified or fabricated messages. 
1.2 Encryption 
Encryption is the method of taking readable text (plaintext) and processing it through 
an algorithm to create a text whose meaning is non-obvious (ciphertext). The algorithm that 
is used can be secret or well known. Since it is impractical for everyone to create their own 
cryptographic algorithm, the secrecy in a cryptosystem usually relies upon some further input 
(a key) in order to create the ciphertext. Depending on the intended use of the encryption, the 
key will be secret (private key) or well known (public key). 
Decryption is the method of translating ciphertext back to the original plaintext. The 
decryption algorithm also needs a key input in order to calculate the correct result. This may 
be the same key that was used when encrypting or it may be a related key, depending upon 
the cryptosystem being used. The two main categories of encryption schemes and their uses 
are explained below. 
1.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
When the key used for decryption is the same as, or easily deduced from, the 
encryption key, this arrangement is known as a symmetric cryptosystem. Other terms 
include secret-key or private-key cryptosystem. (Since the term private-key is used in other 
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cryptosystems, this thesis will use the term secret-key when referring to symmetric 
cryptography.) It is necessary to keep the key a secret between the sender (encrypter) and 
the receiver (decrypter) in order to maintain the security of the information. Implementations 
include algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the International Data 
Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). A full delineation of these algorithms is beyond the scope of 
this thesis but the following references can be consulted for more information: [NBS77], 
[Sc94]. 
One of the challenges with symmetric cryptosystems is the question of how to 
distribute the key. It cannot simply be transmitted over the network because opponents could 
simply observe the value as it is sent. One solution is to use a secure channel to pre-
distribute keys to the parties that need it. Some methods to accomplish this include the Blom 
key [Bl85] and the Diffie-Hellman key [DH76] pre-distribution schemes. Since a secure 
channel may not always be available, there are on-line methods, such as Kerberos [KN93], 
for key distribution. The majority of these methods, both secure channel and on-line, make 
use of an intermediary. This intermediary is a trusted authority that can authenticate itself to 
each party and communicate securely with them. This authentication is in the form of a 
computed signature, which relies on the use of public information. Signature schemes 
generally involve the use of asymmetric cryptography. 
1.2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography 
An asymmetric, or public-key, cryptosystem is one in which the decryption key is not 
easily computed from the encryption key [DH76]. Thus, the encryption key can be made 
public knowledge so that anyone may use it to encrypt a message. However, only the 
receiver knows the decryption key (which is also known as a private key) that is necessary 
decrypt the ciphertext. The decryption and encryption key are mathematically related 
The calculation of these key pairs involves one-way functions. A one-way function is 
one that is easy to compute but hard to invert. More formally, 
A function f: X Y is called one-way if for any x that is an element of X it is 
easy to compute f(x), but given any y that is an element of Y it is 
computationally infeasible to find an x such that f(x) = y. [Be00] 
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Though one-way functions are important in constructing asymmetric cryptosystems, there are 
currently no functions that have been mathematically proven to be one-way; yet, there is 
considerable evidence that they do exist [St95]. 
Because public-key cryptography uses exponentiation, it tends to be much slower (i.e. 
takes more computation time) than symmetric cryptographic methods. Typically, public-key 
cryptography is used to exchange a randomly chosen secret-key that will then be used for the 
communication session and then messages are encrypted using a symmetric algorithm. The 
most commonly used implementation of public-key cryptography is the Rivest-Shamir-
Adelman (RSA) cryptosystem [RSA78]. 
1.3 How Encryption Secures 
Though they use keys differently, both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems 
protect information through the employment of encryption. Encryption can ensure security 
in the event of interception. Before a message is sent, it can be encrypted using either the 
shared secret-key or the intended receiver's public-key, depending on which cryptosystem is 
in use. Only a receiver with knowledge of the secret-key or the private-key that corresponds 
to the public-key used for encryption can decrypt the message. As mentioned above, if an 
unauthorized agent sees the communication, it will not matter because the contents will be 
unintelligible. 
Encryption also allows detection of message modification. Assuming that the 
adversary does not know the encryption key, if a part of an encrypted message is changed or 
deleted by the adversary, then the receiver will not be able to decrypt part or all of the 
message. The part that was modified will look garbled and will at least register as a 
transmission error if not actually be detected as an attack on the communication. 
Finally, encryption protects against the fabrication of messages. An antagonist who 
does not have the secret-key or the private key, cannot encrypt a message in such a way that 
the receiver would be fooled into thinking the message originated from an authorized sender. 
Attempts to decrypt the antagonist's message using the correct key, which does not 
correspond to the antagonist's encrypting key, will result in an unintelligible message. 
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In addition to encrypting messages, public-key cryptography is used for signing 
messages. Whether the message itself is encrypted or not, the signature can be used to 
authenticate the sender and verify the contents. The signature is the result of creating a hash 
(message digest) of the message and then encrypting it using the sender's signing key 
(private-key) [St99]. The hash function can be well known. The receiver decrypts the 
signature using the verification key (public-key of the sender), computes the hash of the 
message, and compares the result with the received hash. If the hashes match, the message 
retained its integrity during transmission. If the hashes do not match, there is a reason to 
suspect alteration or fabrication of the message or signature. 
6 
2. SECURE MULTICASTING 
With the increased reliance on electronic communications, as mentioned in chapter 1, 
as well as with the ever-compounding complexity of technology, it is increasingly rare for an 
individual to work alone. Best practice in business and academic curricula is a focus on 
teams of people that work on projects. In order to accomplish their goals, these teams need 
efficient ways to communicate amongst the group. There are many examples of such group-
oriented communications where information needs to be disseminated among a number of 
people: bodies of legislature, management hierarchy of a company/university, conferences 
and/or classroom situations. 
These group-oriented communications can be accomplished by a variety of methods: 
multiple unicast, broadcast, or multicast. Multiple unicast entails sending a point-to-point 
(unicast) message to each group member. For n senders and r receivers, the number of 
messages sent is n*r. Although this ensures that every group member receives the message, 
the obvious drawback is the lack of scalability and the waste of bandwidth that occurs when a 
message is sent multiple times along links that can potentially be shared among multiple 
group members. Broadcasting is a way to send a message to all parties, interested or not. 
, 
For n senders, n messages are sent and every network entity receives a message, even if the 
entity is not interested in the message. In the case of broadcasting, the benefit is that all 
group members receive the communication with little or no routing. However, it is not 
efficient in terms of network usage since the message is sent to non-group members as well. 
Obviously, there is a scalability problem. Multicast was developed as a way to send a 
message to more than one member while conserving resources by propagating the message 
only as far as it needs to go to reach each group member and only once along each path. For 
n senders, n messages are sent and routers duplicate packets as necessary to forward along a 
path to an interested receiver. 
2.1 Multicasting Defined 
A multicast group was developed from the concept of the host group model is defined 
as which "a host group is a set of network entities sharing a common identifying multicast 
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address, all receiving any data packets addressed to this multicast address by senders 
(sources) that may or may not be members of the same group and have no knowledge of the 
groups' membership"[CD85]. The conservation in resources (versus the aforementioned 
multiple unicast schemes) stems from the fact that routers between sources and receivers 
only send out one copy of an incoming multicast packet per link [D88]. A multiple unicast 
scheme has routers sending a copy for each of the receivers that can be accessed using that 
link. Another advantage is that the source only has to know one multicast address instead of 
multiple unicast addresses, which is beneficial in cases where group membership changes 
frequently, making it cumbersome for a source to keep all addresses updated. Although the 
host group definition allows for non-members to send to the multicast address, secure 
multicasting designates that all senders must be authorized, whether or not they are also 
members of the group. 
Multicasting is useful in many applications [BA99] [Ra00] [SGLA99] [SMOO]. 
Figure 1 shows the multiple models that categorize these applications. One instance is for 
one-to-many (1 toM) communication, also known as single source communication. This 
occurs when one source continuously sends out information to many members for 
applications such as a stock quote feed, a video or audio broadcast, or announcements. A 
second category is that of many-to-many (MtoM), when members of the group may be 
senders as well as receivers therefore requiring the ability to perform two-way multicast. 
One-to-Many Many-to-Many Many-to-One 
S: Sender R: Receiver 
Figure 1. Multicast models [HCD00] 
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Uses for MtoM communication include collaboration among colleagues, voice, video, or text 
conferencing, and multi-player games. The third use of multicasting is many-to-one (Mto 1) 
communications. This scenario involves numerous receivers sending data to one source and 
might be used for voting, auctions, or other data collection applications. 
In order to characterize a multicast application, the following group parameters must be 
known: 
• pervasive vs. sparse -- Whether the group is pervasive, having members on most 
links or subnets or the network, or sparse, having members on a small number of 
widely separated links. 
• open vs. closed -- Whether a group is open, allowing senders to be non-members, or 
closed, requiring senders to be group members. 
• permanent vs. transient -- Whether a group is permanent, existing eternally or at 
least for significant lengths of time, or transient, existing only for a short duration. 
• static vs. dynamic -- Whether the membership of the group is static, remaining 
relatively constant over time, or dynamic, allowing members to join and leave the 
group. 
2.2 Multicast Routing 
There are two broad approaches for constructing multicast trees [DM78] [BFC93]: 
source-based tree and shared tree (also known as core-based tree). In the source-based tree 
approach, a separate tree is constructed for each sender and rooted at that sender node. 
Though this approach can offer better performance (e.g. delay) guarantees, it is not scalable 
since multiple trees must be created for a many-to-many communication situation. The core-
based tree approach is a routing scheme considered ideal for many-to-many communications. 
This approach identifies a core node for the multicast group and constructs a distribution tree 
rooted at this core and spanning all the group members. Multicast packets from senders who 
are not members of the group are forwarded toward the core until they reach a node of the 
distribution tree. From that point, the packet is forwarded to group members as dictated by 
the nature of the distribution tree. The core-based tree approach accommodates both closed 
and open groups and uses a single shared tree for the entire group. The advantages of a core-
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based tree are its ability to adapt to dynamic multicast groups, its suitability for sparsely 
distributed receivers, and its scalability to handle large numbers of senders. 
Not only are there numerous routing protocols, as seen in [Ra00] [SGLA99] [SM00], but 
there are multiple ways to manage a group. The group management issue only compounds 
when group communications need to be secure. Securing multicast communications involves 
distributing cryptographic keys to the members so that each can encrypt and decrypt 
messages as appropriate. To maintain the security of encrypted packets, these keys must be 
recalculated and redistributed at designated times or upon certain events, such as a new 
member being added or removed from the group. Not only does the manager need to be 
aware of membership changes but the manager must propagate the consequences of these 
membership changes to the rest of the group. 
In order to understand and evaluate secure multicast schemes, metrics must be 
defined to serve as a gauge for their effectiveness in solving the multicast problem. These 
metrics and the subjects of secure multicast architectures, group key management, and packet 
source authentication [MRR99] are outlined below. 
2.3 Metrics 
Numerous criteria are used to analyze secure multicast solutions [MRR99] 
[CGIMNP99]. These criteria are categorized into group membership management, network 
resource consumption, receiver resource requirements, sender resource requirements, and 
dependency upon particular standards. Each of these categories is elucidated below. 
Group membership management criteria address the concerns of who is and is not 
part of the group, what the group looks like, and what happens if the group changes. 
Questions to consider when evaluating a solution's membership management capabilities are 
shown in Table 1. 
Another category of criteria is under the heading of network resource consumption. 
These are concerned with the load on the network for various stages of the multicast 
communication process. When analyzing bandwidth consumption of a solution, it is 
important to note how many messages must be transmitted each time a member joins or 
leaves and how large the control messages (those for managing the group) are in relation to 








• Can the solution handle very large, widely distributed 
groups? 
• When the network or system experiences errors, do they 
cause an entire failure or is there a graceful degradation of 
service? 
• If part or all of a group is isolated from communications due 
to network or system failures, can those members be 
restored without needing to reinitialize the entire group? 
• When a member joins, can the new member read any past 
group messages? 
• When a member leaves, are future group communications 
protected from being read by the member who has exited? 
• Is the solution able to handle groups whose membership 
frequently changes by parties joining and leaving or is best 
for a static group? 
• Can the solution cope with peak situations, when multitudes 
of members wish to join ( or leave) simultaneously? 
• Is the solution valuable for short-lived groups or long-term 
groups? 
• Is there a way for a number of non or former members to 
affect the security of messages? 
• How long does message secrecy last (is it ephemeral or 
long-term)? 
• Does the solution explicitly provide or allow group or 
source authentication? 
• Does the solution allow anonymity or non-repudiation? 
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the data messages. Also of importance is the volume of communication that can be 
effectively dealt with and whether the solution can handle bursty traffic. 
Receiver and sender resource requirements consider the following: 
• How many keys must each member or sender store and how large are these keys? 
• What is the processing time involved for the member or sender to, respectively, read 
or send messages? 
• Does the solution allow non-members to send data? 
• How many senders are allowed? Must these senders be known in advance of group 
creation? 
The final concern is the dependence upon standards. Does the solution depend upon 
a particular network protocol or network characteristic (such as stability, in order packet 
delivery, or reliable transmission)? Does the solution depend upon a particular application? 
2.4 Architectures 
The above metrics help in evaluation of the variety of multicast solutions. These 
solutions implement a combination of network architecture and key management schemes. 
The types of architectures include multilevel and two-level. Two-level architectures are 
further typified by their use of distributed or centralized top-level [MRR99]. 
To understand multilevel architectures, we examine the lolus [M97] infrastructure as 
an example. An lolus tree is composed of group security agents (GSAs), which can be 
further divided into a group security controller (GSC) and group security intermediaries 
(GSis). The GSC is the root of the tree and each GSI manages its subgroup's keys and 
communications, including the routing to other GSis. The multilevel structure of lolus stems 
from the fact that GSis can exist on multiple levels and GSis lower on the tree can act as 
clients for GSis above them. For an illustration of this structure, see Figure 2 taken from 
[MRR99]. Since each GSI manages the membership of its own subgroup using its own key 
and is responsible for translating data from one key to another, membership changes are 
localized to one subgroup. This means a reduction in the number of key change messages 
needed for each join and leave. The multitude of GSis makes this solution robust because 
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Figure 2. loins architecture [M97] 
the failure of a single GSI affects only one subgroup. However, there is only one GSC so its 
failure is fatal to the entire multicast group. 
Two-level architectures can have a distributed or centralized top-level. The top-level 
is an overall control that manages keys for messages between subgroups. This key 
management can be distributed, as in the Nortel trunk (Figure 3) [HCDOO], or centralized, as 
in the secure reliable multicast (SRM) toolkit [Ch98]. The lower-level can be hierarchical 
and is divided into subgroups (leafs in Nortel structure and domains in SRM architecture). 
As in Iolus, these subgroups localize membership changes and provide robustness against 
complete group failure. The distributed solution furnishes additional robustness since there 
is no single controller failure concern as in multilevel and centralized two-level solutions. A 
centralized two-level solution, while simpler than the multilevel multicast architecture, is less 
robust and not scalable. 
2.5 Key Distribution 
As shown in the section on security, encryption is used to secure information and this 
encryption relies on the use of keys. The problem in multicasting is how to distribute these 
keys so that each member has the appropriate key at the appropriate time. To ensure perfect 
join secrecy, so that a new member cannot read previous group messages, and leave secrecy, 







Figure 3. Nortel architecture [HCD00] 
time the group membership changes. It is possible to reduce the number of key changes if 
the rules of perfect join and leave secrecy are relaxed to allow new members to read previous 
messages or wait for some small number of members to leave before updating the key. Even 
with the relaxation of rules, it can be difficult to distribute keys efficiently to widely 
distributed or highly dynamic groups. Other complications include the number of keys the 
controller and the clients have to store and the processing time involved in calculating new 
keys. The following strategies attempt to handle key distribution efficiently. 
The simplest plan is to merely unicast the group key to each member as needed. The 
members only have to store the group key and the key used in the unicast with the controller. 
The controller stores the group key and the keys used to unicast messages to the members. 
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This arrangement provides for perfect join and leave secrecy and does not require much key 
storage space. However, it is not efficient for pervasive and dynamic groups since the 
number of control messages could overtake the number of data messages. It also induces a 
strain on the controller to process a large number of secure unicast messages. 
One of the most widely accepted designs is that of key graphs. Though key graphs 
can be arranged in star or tree structures, [WGL00] has found the d-ary tree to be the most 
efficient configuration for group key management. This is a hierarchical arrangement of 
keys such that each member is a leaf on the tree and has as many keys as there are levels in 
the tree. Each time a join/leave occurs, all of the keys on the path from that member to the 
root of the tree are changed as well as the siblings of those keys. Though multiple keys are 
being changed, there are only d rekey messages of the d-ary tree transmitted. For full detail 
of d-ary tree key management, refer to [WGLO0]. The d-ary tree key graph design is highly 
scalable. The members and controller must store multiple keys but the number is related 
logarithmically to the size of the group so remains reasonable. Yet, this scheme, just as the 
simple solution, requires multiple messages to be sent for every join/leave that necessitates 
rekeying. 
One unique approach to key management is that in the SRM toolkit, mentioned 
above. Each member receives a unique subset of the total set of keys held by the controller. 
The number of keys stored by members and the controller is determined by the number of 
members in a domain and is less than the number of keys stored in the d-ary tree scheme. 
The number of messages sent per leaving member is also less than the tree-based scheme 
[Ch98]. When a member leaves the group, the new group key is multicast using all the keys 
not in the subset of the out-going member. Unfortunately, when more than one member 
leaves, the scheme becomes vulnerable to collusion due to the knowledge gained from the 
union of the subsets of keys of more than one member. 
Other key management solutions such as key agreement amongst peers [STW00] and 
decentralized key control [PMZ99] attempt to resolve key management issues. All of these 
have benefits and drawbacks that must be weighed when deciding which to apply. The 
advantage of hierarchical architecture structures is that they allow the opportunity to employ 
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different key management schemes for subgroups, thereby using the best-fit solution at each 
level, depending on the multicast application. 
2.6 Multicast Authentication 
The subject of multicast authentication is recently one of the most. studied. In unicast 
authentication, the receiver only needs to verify the sender. In the multicast field, there are 
multiple grades of authentication. Depending upon the authentication scheme, registered 
receivers are able to determine if a packet came from another registered member, a registered 
sender, or from a particular registered sender. The first grade, that of authenticating the 
sender as a registered member, is done by using message authentication codes (MACs) 
[CGIMNP99]. Receivers must have access to the shared secret key in order to authenticate 
the sender as a member of the group. Though using MACs is efficient for groups, it is not 
useful if the receiver wishes a finer granularity of authentication. On the surface it would 
appear that the authenticating a particular sender is as simple as employing a public-key 
signing algorithm. The sender signs the message with a private key and the receivers can 
verify the message using the sender's public key. However, public-key signing algorithms 
tend to be expensive computationally and consume more bandwidth with longer signatures 
than other schemes. Efficient methods for verifying registered senders and specifically 
identifying these senders are under development [CG98] [WL99]. 
Some solutions involve variations of MACs, such as hashing message authentication 
codes (HMACS) [KBC97] or multiple keyed MACs [CGIMNP99]. Other solutions make use 
of streams [GR97] and flows [WL99]. Some authentication methods involve hybrid schemes 
that use a combination of solutions and offline computations to take advantage of the benefits 
of other scheme benefits and reducing their drawbacks. Like the key management schemes, 
there are multiple proposals for multicast authentication no definitive best solution as of yet. 
The assets and detriments of each plan must be evaluated in context of the desired level of 
authentication and the type of multicast group. These evaluations are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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3. DIFFERENTIAL SECURITY 
As the subject of security has developed, several subtopics have been broached. One 
of these topics focused on the concept of multilevel security [Pf97]. This is mostly widely 
known in its relation to government and, in particular, the military. In this concept, entities 
not just secure or insecure, they have varying degrees of sensitivity. In the United States 
military, these degrees are hierarchical in nature and, listed from least secure to most secure, 
are known as Unclassified, Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The 
communication of information is governed by a policy that is need-to-know: sensitive data 
can only be accessed by parties that need the information in order to perform the duties of 
their job. 
The separating communications by sensitivity levels, or classifications, is ubiquitous 
in the military. Obviously, matters of national security require stringent security regulations. 
There is a need to provide communication schemes that can handle the concept of 
classifications. This need exists not only within the military community, but extends to all 
private sector companies that contract to do business with the military. In reality, even 
companies that do not contract with the military benefit from such schemes. Though the 
hierarchy of sensitivity is not as rigid in commercial industry, they do have such 
classifications as public, proprietary, and internal. They also have corporate structures that 
involve, possibly from least secure to most secure, employees, middle managers, and 
managers. So there is the potential for groups other than the military to benefit from schemes 
that facilitate multilevel communications. 
3.1 Defined 
Differential security is a term developed for this thesis to designate a partial 
implementation of multilevel security. In multilevel security where confidentiality is of 
prime concern, a set of rules directs the flow of information. The Bell and La Padula model 
formally describes these rules [BL73]. In their confidentiality model, there is a set of 
subjects S and a set of Objects 0. The security class, or clearance, of a subject is denoted as 
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C(s) and the security class, or classification level, of an object as C(o). Information can only 
proceed if it follows the two following properties: 
Simple Security Property: A subject s may have read access to an object o 
only if C(o) <= C(s). 
*-Property: A subject s who has read access to an object o may have write 
access to an object p only if C( o) <= C(p) 
These properties are commonly referred to as read-down and write-up respectively. This is 
because a subject may read information from an object that is at its corresponding clearance 
level or below but may only write information at its clearance level or above. The write-up 
property does not mean that a subject can alter data at a higher level; it simply means that the 
subject can make an object, at the subject's security level, more secure by promoting it to a 
higher classification. 
Differential security varies from multilevel in that it does not adhere to the write-up 
property. While it is desirable to prevent subjects from accidentally or maliciously 
declassifying information by writing-down, this write-up rule is overly prohibitive since 
communication with a subject at a lower clearance level is frequently a necessity. An officer 
must be able to give orders to subordinates and a manager must be able to direct employees. 
The proposed differential multicasting scheme that follows acknowledges ways to prevent 
write-down but ultimately rejects this stringent maxim. 
Another discrepancy between differential security and the Bell-La Padula model is 
that of changing security levels. In the Bell-La Padula model, the security classes of subjects 
and objects are fixed and may not be changed. Differential security recognizes that a 
subject's clearance level may change, based on appropriate authorization. Military personnel 
advance in rank, and thus advance in clearance level, and employees are promoted. 
Differential security allows for this possibility. 
Multilevel security not only groups subjects by clearance level, it also designates 
them by compartment. Compartments, or commonly known as projects, may only contain 
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information at one sensitivity ]evel or they may span mu1tiple levels. This supports the need-
to-know policy by further limiting subjects' realm of knowledge to the information essential 
to their job performance. The separation of subjects and objects into compartments naturally 
gives rise to the use of multicasting. A multicast group can be formed for each 
compartments' subjects (project group). Those subjects, receivers and senders in the group, 
wil1 only access objects (read/write messages) that pertain to their compartment. By 
combining mu1ticasting with differential security, the desired means of securing 
communications, of classifying information and containing it within a compartment, can be 
achieved. 
3.2 Applications Explored 
Differentially secure multicasting, as developed in this thesis, fits situations when 
communications are needed for an entire group as well as for portions of a group. Most one-
to-many multicast communications do not need this capability; they usually send all 
information to all parties. Such is also true of many-to-one communications. Many-to-many 
mu1ticast uses are more suitable to differential security, as shown below. Due to the 
overhead of a larger number of rekeying messages whenever a member joins or leaves that 
has a clearance level greater than the lowest level in the group, this scheme works best when 
the group is relatively static. However, when group members at the lowest level leave, there 
is no bandwidth cost difference between this and non-differentially secure multicasting (also 
referred to in this thesis as regularly secure mu1ticasting). Also related to the number of the 
key distribution messages, the set-up time for a differentially secure group can be higher than 
a regularly secure multicast group. Thus, this scheme is not suitable for short-lived groups. 
The best-fit application for this scheme is that of a project group. In this many-to-
many communication situation, the team members need to be able to synchronize 
information easily with the group. Managers need to agree with each other as to the direction 
of the project and send instructions to the project team. The group, once formed, tends to 
remain re1ative1y static so there is no overload of rekeying traffic for members who ]eave. 
There will be some join/leave activity, since different experts are needed at each stage of a 
project, but if these people are limited to the lowest clearance, there will be no extra traffic 
when compared to a regular secure multicast group. There is the possibility of promotion 
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and demotion, which would increase the number of rekeying messages, but these happen 
infrequently during a typical communication session. 
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4. PROPOSED APPROACHES 
In order to explore the ways to implement differential security in multicasting, the 
concept itself must be articulated. This chapter first explains differentially secure 
multicasting and then examines three ways to achieve this concept. Although each approach 
is functional, they have distinct benefits and drawbacks. A comparison of these approaches 
will follow their explanations. 
4.1 Differentially Secure Multicasting 
We begin by defining a notion for a security level. In this thesis, the least secure 
(lowest clearance) level is referred to as level 1. The highest clearance level is level 4. This 
could correspond to the military hierarchy with level 1 being Restricted and level 4 as Top 
Secret. Any material considered Unclassified would not need to be encrypted and can 
therefore be sent as plaintext and considered to be at level 0. These level designations are not 
exclusive to military applications. Private industry may define level Oto be public, level 1 to 
be proprietary, and level 2 to be internal. There are no limitations in how many levels there 
are or how each is described; for practical purposes, this thesis will work with groups of four 
levels of security. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is considerable attention paid to who can 
read what when discussing multilevel security. Since differential security allows a subject to 
read information that is classified at or below the same level as the subject, each member of a 
differentially secure multicast group must have all the keys to enable this. A member at level 
4 would have keys relating to level 4, level 3, level 2, and level 1 communications. A 
member at level 1 would only have the level 1 key. Using the notation that C(S) indicates 
the classification level of an subject (in this case, the encryption key denoted as ek), then the 
set of keys held by a members, where Sk is the set of keys, G is the multicast group, and m is 
a member, is as follows: 
Sk(m)={ ek: eke Sk(G) A C(ek) <= C(s)} 
For each join and leave by member m, all ek in member m's possession need to be updated. 
To provide join secrecy, the key(s) for communication are updated whenever a new member 
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is added. This is easy to do by simply multicasting the new key to existing members and 
unicasting the new key to the new member. When a member leaves, the task of updating 
key(s) becomes more involved. Changing all of the group keys that the leaving member 
possessed means sending secure unicast messages to all members cleared at or below the 
leaving member's level. However, any member above that level can receive the new keys via 
secure multicast since the higher-level keys are not affected. One unicast message, 
containing multiple keys, is sent to all group members who need new keys. (For larger keys, 
the message will be split into multiple packets.) It is important to note that the level of the 
key does not indicate its encryption strength. Indeed, all levels may have equally strong 
encryption. The level simply indicates the communication stream with which the key works. 
Granted, a level 1 key is typically known by more people so there is a greater chance of 
collusion with an outsider. There are also more opportunities for attack, since there are a 
greater number of entities with knowledge of that key. 
Requiring the members to hold multiple keys raises the issue of member resources. 
With a diverse group, some members may be more limited in computation resources than 
others. Since key sizes are currently in the range of two kilobytes and less, storing as many 
as four keys does not seem an undue strain on a receiver. If the security hierarchy is 
considerably deepened, the memory needed to store these keys may become a limiting factor 
when creating differentially secure groups. 
Just as in non-differentially secure multicasting, in order to join the group to receive 
any keys, the requestor must first authenticate to a group controller. This authority must 
have the ability to verify the correct clearance level of the joiner and issue all the relevant 
keys for a member at that level. This is done by way of secure unicast to the joiner. 
The authenticating authority could serve as an agent to allow true write-up 
communications. Thus far, the assumption is that members will only need to write packets at 
their own level yet read packets at or below their levels. However, implementing the write-
up also would allow for the advancement of classification. Since a member does not hold 
keys for higher levels, any communication that should be advanced in classification needs to 
be sent to an intermediary who can re-encrypt the information using the higher-level key. 
The authenticating authority already has possession of all the keys and is presumed to have 
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greater computing power, since it must be able to handle all requests for changes in group 
membership, so it would be natural to assign this task as well. However, it is precisely the 
job of handling authentication that may make the authority a bottleneck if it must also 
promote information and forward it. The implementer must decide whether the authenticator 
is an acceptable risk as a bottleneck or if distributing the keys to another third party is an 
acceptable risk of another potential security leak. One way to avoid using a trusted third 
party would be to assign read keys and write keys at each level by using a public-key 
algorithm. Though this would eliminate the need for an assigned promoter, this would also 
more than double the number of keys stored by each member. In addition, as previously 
noted, the use of public-key encryption is not ideal since it is computationally slower. 
The possession of multiple keys adds an aspect to the authentication problem. In 
non-differentially secure multicasting, there is no ordained way to authenticate a sender. All 
the receivers know is that the sender was authorized because the message was encrypted with 
the correct key. In differentially secure multicasting, an additional question arises regarding 
the security level at which the communication originated. Though an encrypted 
communication must come from an authorized sender, there is no designated way to 
determine at what level the sender is cleared. A member at level 4 can send a level 1 
classified packet and the receivers of that packet would not automatically know what 
clearance level the sender has. However, all recipients of a level 2 packet would know that 
the originator is at least cleared as high as level 2. Thus, a packet at the highest level can 
only have come from one of the few members cleared at that level. 
Also analogous to non-differentially secure multicasting, the members of a 
differentially secure multicast group do not necessarily know who within the authorized set 
of senders sent a packet. There is no prohibition against using an authentication scheme, 
such as those mentioned in Section 2.5, but there is no explicit prescription for one either. 
This allows for flexibility of choice when implementing differentially secure multicasting. 
One reason authentication might be used is to reestablish the "no write-down" rule of 
multilevel security. A sender who is forced to authenticate at a particular level could not 
evade the rule and compose a packet at a lower level. 
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The following approaches are assessed in terms of the total tree cost, the cost of 
sending one packet at each security level originating from the core node of the tree at that 
security level. The performance is measured with respect to the bandwidth consumed per 
packet transmission. The method by which this is measured accompanies the explanation of 
the approaches. 
4.2 Na:ive Approach 
The Naive solution to differentially secure multicasting is to create separate multicast 
trees for each level of security, as shown in Figure 4. For the sake of illustration, only a two-
level clearance is shown. Setting up regularly secure multicast trees is a well-known 
procedure. All group members at level 1 clearance are in the level 1 tree, all group members 
at a level 2 clearance are in the level 2 tree, etc. The obvious disadvantage is that assigning 
an address for each tree consumes more address space than a single tree. This becomes a 
multiplicative resource consumer if multiple differentially secure trees are instantiated. 
The core may or may not be the same for each tree. If the core is not the same for 
each tree, there must be a way for lower-level packets to reach higher-level members. One 
way is to have all cores attach to the level 1 group, cores for groups higher than 2 attach to 
level 2, etc. However, this would create redundant packets on higher levels. The level 3 core 
would receive a level 1 message from the level 1 core and the same message from the level 2 
core. The level 4 core would receive three copies of each level 1 packet and two copies of 
each level 2 packet. A better method is to have the cores of each tree become a member of 
the tree of the next lowest level. In this connection scheme, each level only receives one 
copy of each lower level's packets. Note that in Figure 4, node 2 sends a level 1 packet to 
node 1 which must then forward that to all level 2 members. To send a packet to node 8, the 
link between node 2 and node 1 is utilized. Thus, two packets are transmitted over the path 
between nodes 1 and 2 for each level 1 communication. 
The total tree cost for the nai"ve approach is calculated in the following manner. 
Assuming all links to have equal weight, the number of links over which a packet must flow 
to reach all receivers is counted. In Figure 4, (where N designates node number and L 
designates security clearance) the cost to send a level 2 packet is calculated by adding the 
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links from nodes 1 to 6, 6 to 7, 1 to 2, and 2 to 8 for a cost of 4. The cost to send a level 1 
packet is calculated by adding the links from node 2 to 1, 1 to 9, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, 4 to 5, plus the 
cost of sending a level 2 packet since the level 1 packet is forwarded to the level 2 tree by the 
core of level 2. The cost for sending a level 1 packet is 9. The total cost for the tree is 
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Figure 4. Naive Approach 
\ 
Group 1 tree, rooted at 2 
Group 2 tree, rooted at 0 
Lightly shaded node is member of group 2 
Heavily shaded node is member of both groups 












Cost to send level 1 packet: 9 
Cost to send level 2 packet: 4 
Total cost: 13 
Having separate cores can make group communications more robust; if one core fails, 
the other levels can still communicate. However, this also means more machines are needed 
that have enough resources to manage this information. If the trees have the same core, there 
is an increased burden on this one core to manage multiple trees. 
In either case, the core(s) for groups oflevel greater than 1 must be able to take a 
packet from a lower level, readdress it to the higher level(s) and forward the packet to these 
addresses. This readdressing requires that there be a label on the packet designating its 
security level. Though any level 1 receiver would automatically know to use the only key 
available, any level 2 or above receiver needs to choose which decryption key is needed to 
unlock the message. This label would only consume a few more bits per packet so it would 
consume trivial additional bandwidth. The router need not note the label since it can forward 
the packets appropriately based on the multicast address. The disadvantage of using such 
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labels is that an adversary can easily see it and use it to analyze traffic and well as know 
which packets are most desirable for cryptanalysis. An opponent would also know which 
machines communicated at the highest level and would be able to concentrate attacks on 
those machines in hopes of gathering more keys upon successful intrusion. Group members 
in any multicast scheme involving secure communications, differential or not, must practice 
best-known methods to prevent compromise of their keys. 
4.3 Multiple Tree DiffSec Approach 
The multiple tree differentially secure (DiffSec) solution, like the Naive scheme, 
creates separate multicast trees for each level of security, as shown in Figure 5. As in the 
Nai·ve scheme, the disadvantage is consumption of address space for each tree. The 
difference in this case is that all members are in the level 1 multicast tree, group members at 
clearance level 2 or above are in the level 2 multicast group, etc. 
\ 
\ 
Group I tree, rooted at 2 
Group 2 tree, rooted at 0 
Lightly shaded node is member of group 2 
\ Heavily shaded node is member of both groups 
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Figure 5. Multiple tree Dift'Sec example 
Cost to send level I packet: 7 
Cost to send level 2 packet: 4 
Total Cost: 11 
The core may or may not be the same for each tree. As mentioned above, having 
separate cores allows for robustness but consumes management resources. In this case, the 
communication overhead for joins and leaves will be greatly increased since each joining and 
leaving member at level 2 or greater will have to contact multiple cores. Unlike the Naive 
approach, there is no need to label each packet with the appropriate security level; it is 
inherently known by the address of the group. The total tree cost is calculated in the same 
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manner as in the nai've approach. Note that the cost for node 7 to receive a level 2 packet 
from node 1 is 2 while the cost for node 7 to receive a level 1 packet from node 2 is 1. 
4.4 Single DiffSec Tree Approach 
The single tree DiffSec approach is to set up one multicast tree that has all levels in 
one tree. The setup time for this is a little longer since each router has to know the highest 
level of each link to a downstream node so that it can forward all packets at that level or 
below. This means that node 1 in Figure 5 must know that it should forward only packets of 
level 1 since the clearance level of node 1 is 2. This value is known as the max.child and 
indicates the maximum-security clearance of all of its children. True, the router must store 
the extra information but in comparison to storing multiple address entries, as in the Naive 
scheme, this classification level information would require little space in memory. The 
increased setup time stems from the need to propagate this maxchild value up the tree. 
In the worst-case situation, if the member who joins as a leaf node has the highest 
security clearance of its branch, this information would need to propagate up to the top of the 
tree. With a tree of height h, this means as many as h update maxchild messages could be 
sent per joining member. Updating the maxchild value when a member leaves generates 
more packets than the join in the worst-case. Using the instance of a leaf member with the 
highest clearance level on its branch, leaving the group would propagate to the immediate 
parent and the parent would have to check all of its children to determine which is now the 
maxchild. (The query is only sent to the immediate children and does not need to recurse 
down the tree since the values are refreshed for each join). This parent then sends the update 
maxchild message and its parent, the grandparent of the leaving member, repeats the query of 
children to determine if this new value is the max or not. The message continues to 
propagate until the new update maxchild message does not cause a change in the value of the 
receiver of the message. In the worst-case, this message propagates up to the core of the tree. 
For a d-ary tree of height h, the cost of updating the maxchild upon a leave could be as much 
as O(d*h). 
Not only must the router know the levels of the links, it must also know the 
classification of the packets. This can be accomplished using classification labels, as 
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mentioned in the Naive scheme. The same drawback of potential traffic analysis exists. 
Despite the additional bits needed for the label, the single DiffSec tree would actually 
conserve bandwidth. In the Naive approach, the separate trees may have links in common. 
There is the potential that a level one packet transmitted to all trees, would flow multiple 
times over the same link. With all the members in one tree, only one copy of a packet would 
be sent per link, instead of possible multiple copies as in the Naive approach. 
Figure 6. Single DiffSec tree example 
All group tree, rooted at 2 ----
Lightly shaded node is member at level 2 
Node not oart of either tree in italic 
Cost to send level 1 packet: 7 
Cost to send level 2 packet: 3 
Total Cost: 10 
4.5 Comparison 
The nai've, multiple tree, and single DiffSec tree approaches are compared below in 
Table 2. The comparison is based on the metrics of scalability and link cost. Each 
approach's ability to scale relates to the ease of implementation, the allowance of 
simultaneous communication levels, and the amount of resource consumption. Ease of 
implementation is determined by the compared setup times and the number of controllers 
needed to facilitate the scheme. The Nai·ve and multiple tree approaches, which rely on 
separately creating trees, will have longer setups time than the single DiffSec tree, which will 
only take the same initialization time as the level 1 tree in the multiple tree approach. The 
Nai've and multiple tree approaches may have as many as one controller for each group. The 
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single DiffSec tree only has one controller. All schemes allow members at different levels to 
communicate simultaneously. The amount of resource consumption is evaluated in terms of 
the number of addresses consumed and the number of routing table entries needed. The 
nai"ve and multiple tree approaches will consume more multicast addresses (one for each tree) 
than the single tree approach. The Nai·ve and multiple tree solutions will also require more 
routing table entries because each multicast address will be maintained separately. Links for 
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higher level members may possibly be referenced multiple times. The total tree cost for the 
Nai've approach should always be the greatest since this case has the greatest overlap of 
communication links. The cost for multiple trees can be smaller than the cost for a single 
DiffSec tree for sparse groups but for pervasive groups, which have more path options to the 
core of the tree, the single DiffSec tree will cost less on average than a multiple tree DiffSec 
implementation. For a lightly connected network, one with has a smaller average degree of 
links per node, and a densely connected network, the multiple tree and single tree cases result 
in equal costs and the Nai've case has the greatest cost. The cost of the single tree case is 
improved when choosing the core to be at the highest level instead of the lowest level. 
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5. EXPERIMENTS 
The experiments in this thesis involve performing cost analyses of the three 
arrangements of differentially secure multicast groups. The software program ns, created at 
the University of California, Berkeley, was used to construct networks and multicast groups 
with varying characteristics. For each randomly connected network and multicast group with 
given parameters, the three differentially secure schemes were constructed and the costs were 
calculated. The following chapter explains how the setup of the experiments and their 
results. 
5.1 Experiment Setup 
First, a network was constructed with a given number of nodes and a given number of 
links. For processing purposes, the number of nodes was limited to 64. The randomness in 
the connectivity was achieved using the random number generator available in ns. By 
seeding this function with predefined good seeds, ns can create a list of random node 
connectivities that is statistically independent. The number of links ranged from 96 to 256 in 
steps of 16. Specifying the number of links controls the density of the network and the 
number of available paths for group communications. The random nature of assigning these 
links caused some redundant connections. The average degree of each node ranged from 2.4 
(when 96 links were created) to 5.8 (when 256 links were created). 
Once the network was constructed, the ns random number generator was used to 
randomly and uniformly assign levels to a given number of receivers. The number of 
receivers was varied from 12 to 36 in steps of 4 since the experiments in this thesis are 
limited to groups with 4 levels. Electing receivers among nodes of the network was 
randomized so that any node may be picked to be a receiver. Once receivers were elected, 
that group was used between experiments of the same number of receivers. In one case, a 
uniform distribution was enforced so that each security level had an equal number of 
receivers. In the second case, the receivers were distributed nonuniformly so that 
approximately 40% of the receivers were at level 1, 25% were at level 2, 20% were at level 
3, and 15% were at level 4. The nonuniform distribution simulates the case of a group with a 
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few managers and many employees. To illustrate the randomness of the configuration in a 
manageable fashion, Figure 7 shows a randomly generated 10-node network with 20 links 
and 6 receivers. 
Once the network was established and the receivers defined, the following algorithms 
in Figures 8 through 11 were used to construct differentially secure groups using each 
scheme and count the cost of that scheme. Each multicast group had a cost variable 
associated with it. The total cost is calculated by counting the cost for each group if a packet 
at each level was transmitted and adding all the group costs together. As each node joined, 
that cost variable for the group was updated to reflect the number of links traveled for a 
communication packet to reach all members. In the Na"ive scheme, the total cost is found by 
adding the cost for each group and multiplying it by its level to achieve the actual cost for the 
group. A level 3 tree that has a cost of 4 links would have an overall cost of 3*4=12 since 
the 4 links must propagate level 1, level 2, and level 3 packets. In the multiple tree scheme, 
the groups includes everyone at or below that level so there is no need to multiply the group 
cost and the level of the group. Simply total the group costs for all levels. In the single 
Figure 7. Randomly generated 10 node network with 20 links and 2 levels 
[for illustration only] 
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DiffSec tree case, a value must be kept up-to-date at each node that indicates the highest 
clearance level of that node's children. If the node is a leaf node, this variable, maxchild, 
will be equal to the level of the node. A single DiffSec tree, created from the random 
network shown in Figure 7, is shown in Figure 12 with the max child variable of each node 
indicated. 
ConstructNaiveDiffSec{ 
For level from 1 to 4 
Assign lowest node number at that level to be the 
core for group #level 
For all nodes in the tree 
If node has a non-zero level 
join node to the group at its level 
For all cores of groups greater than level 1 
Join core to core of the group of the next lowest 
level 
For levels 1 to 4 
Set total cost to total cost+ 
(cost of group at level* level) 
} 
Figure 8. Evaluating Naive DiffSec scheme 
} 
ConstructMTreeDiffSec{ 
For level 1 to 4 
Assign lowest node number at that level to be the 
core for group level 
For all nodes in the tree 
If node has a non-zero level 
Join node to all groups from 1 to level 
For levels 1 to 4 
Set total cost to total cost+ cost of group at 
level 
Figure 9. Evaluating multiple tree DiffSec cost 
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ConstructSTreeDiffSec{ 
For level 1 
Assign lowest node number at level 1 to be the 
core for the group 
For all nodes in the tree 
If node has a non-zero level 
Join node to the group 
For all nodes except the core 
Set cost to cost+ max(maxchild(node) ,level(node)) 
} 
Figure 10. Evaluating single DiffSec tree cost 
maxchild(node) { 
} 
If level of node is non-zero and node is a leaf node 
maxchild = level of node 
else if level of node is non-zero 
maxchild = max(maxchild values of all children of 
node) 
Figure 11. Updating maxchild value for single DiffSec tree 
Lightly shaded nodes have level of 2 
maxchild: 1 
maxchild: 2 
Figure 12. Single DiffSec tree example 
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5.2 Experimental Results 
Each simulation run had 60 trials, where a trial means creating a network with a given 
number of links, a given number of receivers and counting the cost of each of the three 
schemes. The single tree scheme was constructed in two different manners, one in which the 
core was at level 1 and a second in which the core was at level 4. On average the Na"ive 
scheme has the highest cost, the single DiffSec scheme with a level 1 core the next highest, 
the multiple tree DiffSec scheme the third highest, and the single DiffSec scheme with a level 
4 core the lowest cost, as seen in Figures 13, 14, 15 and 16. In Figures 13 and 14, the 
number of receivers is varied from 16 to 36 in steps of 4. When 50% of the nodes (32 nodes) 
in the network are part of the differential security group, the single DiffSec tree scheme with 
a level 1 core begins to exhibit a cost-savings over the multiple tree scheme. The cost 
difference between the multiple tree scheme and the single tree scheme is within the range of 
the number of levels in the group. By simply moving the single DiffSec tree core from group 
1 to group 4, the cost difference between the multiple tree and single DiffSec tree schemes 
may be eliminated or even improved, as seen in the figures. With 95% certainty, the true 
means for the schemes in Figures 13 and 15 are within the range ±4.561, ±2.463, ±2.947, and 
±2.882 for the Na"ive, multiple tree, single tree with level 1 core, and single tree with level 4 
core respectively. The true means for the schemes in Figures 14 and 16 are have a 95% 
probability of being within the range ±4.057, ±2.259, ±2.937, and ±2.502 for the Na"ive, 
multiple tree, single tree with level 1 core, and single tree with level 4 core respectively. 
In Figures 15 and 16, the number of links is varied from 96 to 256 in steps of 16. As 
the number of links is increased, the cost of the trees decrease since there are more paths 
available to the core so the hop length between each member and the core is less. As above, 
the multiple tree scheme and the single DiffSec tree have nearly equal costs while the naive 
scheme the highest cost. The difference between the multiple tree and single DiffSec tree 
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Figure 16. Effect of network connectivity on tree cost, nonuniform case. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
With the explosion of the use of electronic means for communication there has been a 
corresponding increasing desire to protect and ensure information as it is transmitted. The 
means of information assurance involves the use of various cryptographic systems. At the 
same time as the spreading employment of encryption to secure messages is the burgeoning 
of multicasting to support group communication applications. The challenge faced is how to 
combine the two fields and provide secure multicast communications. 
Secure multicasting has been studied from the aspects of group architecture, group 
key management and sender authentication. There are multiple methods to implement each 
of these topics. The characteristics of the multicast group determine which of these methods 
or combination of these methods will be most beneficial for a particular situation. One area 
not explored in secure multicasting is the implementation of multilevel secure encrypted 
communications. Multilevel security has been considered in the sender authentication issue 
[WL99] but not in terms of securing communications at multiple sensitivity levels within a 
group. Project groups, in both the military and business communities, have multilevel 
security attributes and can benefit from the development of a multilevel secure group 
communication scheme. 
The concept proposed in this thesis is that of differentially secure multicasting. Based 
from concepts in the Bell-La Padula multilevel security model, differentially secure 
multicasting relaxes some of the rules so as not to prevent necessary communications 
between group members at differing security levels. The differential security model can be 
integrated into a multicast setting in three ways. These approaches were compared using 
simulated networks and with varying characteristics. 
In all cases, the NaYve set up scheme proved to be the worst option. Maintaining 
separate trees for each level of communication increases the number of packets because some 
links between nodes exist in multiple groups. A group, not knowing about the membership 
or routing paths of the other groups, may use part of the same path another group used to 
send same packet to a different member. The drawbacks of the naYve scheme overshadow 
the benefit of easy set up. 
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The multiple tree and single DiffSec tree approaches have nearly equal link costs. In 
the single DiffSec tree scheme, selecting a core at the highest level results in a cost savings 
that brings the single DiffSec tree cost in-line with or less than the multiple tree scheme. The 
equality of costs of these schemes means that other factors must be considered when 
choosing which one to implement. The benefits of the multiple tree scheme include graceful 
failure, since the cores of the trees can be separate from one another, and the ability to be 
implemented using existing technology since routers send packets based on the address of the 
group without regard to security level labels on packets. The benefits of the single DiffSec 
tree scheme include a conservation of multicast addresses and a reduction of routing entries 
needed to send packets to each member. For a pervasive group where group members 
consist of 50% or more of the network, the single tree scheme is the best option since it has 
the lowest cost. 
There is much future work to be done for the single DiffSec tree scheme to be 
deployed. The protocols for propagating and updating the maxchild values at each node need 
to be defined .. The optimization algorithms used to minimize the cost of communications by 
carefully choosing a core would need to take into account the level of the core when making 
decisions. The packet format must be defined to include the security label. With the 
growing use of secure multicast communications and the demonstrated benefits of the single 
DiffSec tree, implementations of this scheme would be desirable and useful to the business 
and military community alike. 
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